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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHIRLEE M. HOUSLEY and 
REESE C. HOUSLEY 
P'laintiff s-Appel'lants 
vs. 
THE ANACONDA COMPANY, a 
corporation and DENNIS P. COX, 
Defendants-Respondents 
Case No. 
10612 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The Anaconda Company, hereinafter referred to as 
"Anaconda" and Dennis P. Cox, hereinafter referred to as 
"Cox" do not adopt the statement of facts set forth in the 
brief of Shirlee M. Housley and Reese C. Housley, here-
inafter referred to as "Plaintiffs". 
The statement of facts contained in plaintiff's brief 
is incomplete and inaccurate. A chronological review of 
the proceedings in the trial court should be helpful. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 5, 1959, Cox, a resident of the State of 
Utah, was driving a motor vehicle owned by the Anaconda 
Company east on 5th South in Salt Lake City. (R 58) He 
was following a 1954 Chevrolet sedan driven by plaintiff 
Shirlee M. Housley and owned by plaintiff Reese C. Hous-
ley. As the two vehicles approached the intersection of 
5th South and 4th East, the driver of another vehicle 
proceeding south on 4th East failed to stop for the stop 
sign on the northwest corner of the intersection. Shirlee 
Housley slammed on her brakes to avoid colliding with the 
car which ran the stop sign. Cox was unable to stop in 
time and collided with the rear of the Housley vehicle. 
(R 132) Cox was on his way home for lunch at the time 
of the accident. (R 134) 
On the 22nd day of February, 1959, Cox left the State 
of Utah to accept employment in Brazil, South America. 
(R 58) Cox lived in Brazil for approximately two years 
then returned to the United States and now resides in 
Bethesda, Maryland. (R 58) 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Anaconda and Cox 
on September 27, 1960. Anaconda was served on Septem-
ber 28, 1960. (R 7) Cox has never been served in the 
State of Utah. 
Three years after the complaint had been filed, plain-
tiffs moved to amend their complaint. (R 15) The amended 
complaint contained an additional count alleging in sub-
stance that Cox had a "chose in action against his em-
ployer and the employer's insurance carrier upon which in 
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rem jurisdiction (could) be acquired." (R 19) Cox's attor-
ney made a special appearance to object to the motion to 
amend the complaint on the ground Cox did not have 
property in the State of Utah which could be made the 
subject of an in rem proceeding. (R 60) 
The motion was heard before Judge Jeppson who ruled, 
after considering memorandums filed by both sides, that 
plaintiffs could amend their complaint. (R 61) Judge 
Jeppson further ruled that Cox had made a special appear-
ance challenging jurisdiction over his person and such 
appearance did not constitute a general appearance. (R 61) 
Cox was served with the summons and amended com-
plaint in Bethesda, Maryland on January 19, 1964. (R 27) 
A \Vrit of Garnishment was served on The Travelers In-
surance Company (hereinafter referred to as "Travelers") 
on March 4, 1964. (R 42) Travelers answered the inter-
rogatories attached to the Writ of Garnishment by stating 
that it was not indebted to Cox and did not have under 
its control any property, effects, goods, chattels, rights, 
credits or choses in action of Cox. (R 44) Travelers further 
answered the Writ of Garnishment by statinp- it did insure 
Anaconda at the time of the accident in question and the 
definition of the "insured" included anyone who was using 
the motor vehicle with the permission of the named in-
sured. (R 45) Plaintiff's did not reply to Travelers answers 
to the interrogatories. 
Cox filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on 
the ground the court did not have jurisdiction over his per-
son and to quash the summons on the ground he was not 
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served in the State of Utah. (R 33) The motion was 
supported by the affidavit of Cox in which he stated at 
the time of the accident (January 1959) he was a resident 
of the State of Utah and on or about the 22nd day of Feb-
ruary, 1959, he left the State to work in South America. 
(R 58) Cox further stated that after living in South 
America for two years he returned to the United States 
and became a resident of Bethesda, Maryland. (R 58) 
The motion to dismiss and to quash summons was de-
nied by Judge Aldon Anderson. (R 62, 63) Cox filed a 
motion for rehearing asserting that the order denying the 
motions to dismiss and quash summons deprived him of 
his property without due process of law, contrary to the 
provisions of Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah, and contrary to the provisions of the XIV 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 
(R 64) 
The motion for rehearing was argued before Judge 
Anderson. Briefs were filed by plaintiffs and Cox. The 
Judge granted the motion of Cox to quash summons. (R 82) 
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to set aside the order 
quashing summons. (R 84) This motion was also argued 
before Judge Anderson. At the hearing on the motion 
to set aside the order quashing summons, Judge Ander-
son ruled that the order quashing summons be set aside 
and the parties be permitted to file additional briefs. After 
considering the briefs, Judge Anderson ruled that the 
motion to set aside the order quashing summons be de-
nied. (R 127) Judge Anderson stated that in his opinion 
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the prior ruling of Judge Jeppson allowing the plaintiffs 
to amend their complaint did not preclude him from grant-
ing the motion to quash summons. (R. 102) 
At the pretrial Anaconda Company moved for a sum-
mary judgment on the ground Cox was not in the scope of 
his employment at the time of the accident. (R 132) The 
motion for summary judgment was supported by the affi-
davit of Cox, stating in substance, that at the time of the 
accident he was on his way home to have lunch with his 
wife and he had no intention of going into the field after 
lunch. (R 134) 
The motion for summary judgment was argued before 
Judge Merrill C. Faux. Plaintiff's and Anaconda submitted 
memoradums in support of their positions. The motion for 
summary judgment was granted by Judge Faux. (R 160) 
Plaintiffs have appealed; (1) from the order of Judge 
Jeppson holding Cox made a special appearance to chal-
lenge jurisdiction over his person; (2) from the order of 
Judge Anderson quashing the service of summons on Cox 
and (3) from the order granting summary judgment in 
favor of Anaconda. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COX HAS NOT WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION. 
Plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint came 
on for hearing before Judge Jeppson on November 6, 1963. 
The amended complaint contained an additional count alleg-
ing in substance that Anaconda had a policy of liability 
insurance insuring itself and any person using an owned 
vehicle with the permission of the insured, all in accord-
ance with the provisions of Section 41-12-21 (b) (2) Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 (Safety Responsibility Act). The 
amended complaint also contained the allegation: 
"That, whether contained in said policy or not, 
by express provision of Section 41-12-21 (f) (1), 
Utah Code Annotated .... 'the liability of the in-
surance carrier with respect to the insurance 
required by this act shall become absolute whenever 
injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle 
liability occurs ... .' 
The final allegation was that Cox had a "valuable chose 
in action against his employer and the employer's insurance 
carrier upon which in rem jurisdiction (could) be acquired." 
(R 18, 19) 
Cox's attorney made a special appearance to object to 
the motion to amend on the ground Cox did not have any 
property in the State of Utah which could be made the 
subject of an in rem action. (R 60) 
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The reporter's transcript of the hearing on the motion 
to amend shows the following proceedings were had: 
THE COURT: This motion is to amend as to Mr. 
Cox, is it not? 
MR. FULLER: Essentially as to Mr. Cox, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you have any objection to that? 
MR. NEBEKER: We would object to that-appear-
ing especially for that purpose, yes. 
THE COURT: What is your objection? 
MR. NEBEKER: Our objections are, your Honor, 
the amendment relies apparently upon the 
financial responsibility, which we maintain does 
not apply, and we have produced an affidavit 
from Mr. Reece of that division stating that 
Mr. Cox was never required to obtain proof of 
financial responsibility. 
THE COURT: You do not represent Mr. Cox? 
MR. NEBEKER: We are appearing especially for 
that purpose, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You do not represent Mr. Cox? 
MR. NEBEKER: For the purpose of resisting this 
amendment, yes. No jurisdiction over Mr. Cox, 
that is the problem. 
THE COURT: Are you Mr. Cox' attorney? You 
did not so state. 
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MR. NEBEKER: Yes, I would represent here we 
are representing him for the purpose of this 
amendment. 
THE COURT: Do you want to argue he cannot 
state a cause of action against Mr. Cox? 
MR. NEBEKER: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I will hear the matter when we get 
to it. 
The bulk of the argument of counsel was not reported. 
(R 167) 
On December 5, 1963, a minute entry was made stating 
Judge Jeppson's ruling: 
"Court grants plaintiffs' motion to amend and 
orders that plaintiffs may plead in rem and issue 
garnishment requested. Court finds defendant did 
not make general appearance and did not waive his 
defense of no jurisdiction." (R 67) 
At the hearing on Cox's motion to dismiss and to quash 
summons, a question arose concerning Judge J eppson's 
prior ruling on the motion to amend. On May 19, 1964, 
Judge Jeppson signed the following order: 
"Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that: 
1. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has a chose in action 
under a liability insurance policy which can be 
reached by plaintiffs to acquire in rem jurisdiction 
in these proceedings, and plaintiffs' motion to 
amend their complaint accordingly is hereby granted 
and garnishment may issue as requested. 
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2. Defendant Dennis P. Cox has made a special 
appearance herein challenging personal jurisdiction 
over his person, and that such appearance did not 
constitute a general appearance since the aforesaid 
ruling of the court that in rem jurisdiction can be 
had herein is considered by the court to be a special 
appearance." (R 60-61) 
Judge Jeppson, after hearing all the argument by coun-
sel, held that Cox's attorney had made a special appear-
ance challenging j uridsiction over his person and had not 
made a general appearance. 
Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
was amended slightly from Rule 12(b) of the Federal 
Rules, has abolished the old distinction of special and gen-
eral appearance. A defendant need no longer appear 
specially to attack the court's jurisdiction over him. There 
is no penalty if the attorney undertakes a "special appear-
ance" though the label will be of no legal significance. 
"There is no longer any necessity for appearing 
specially, as subdivision (b) provides that every 
defense may be made either in the responsive plead-
ing or by motion. However, there is no penalty if 
the pleader, mindful of the old ways, undertakes a 
'special appearance' though the label will be of no 
legal significance." Vol. lA Barron & Holtzoff 
Rule 12 Sec. 343 p. 284. 
In Orange Theatre Corporation v. Ray Hertz Amuse-
ment Corp. 139 F.2d 871 (3rd Cir. 1944) cert. den. 322 
U.S. 740, 88 L.ed. 1573, 64 S.Ct. 1057, it was held that 
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has abo~ 
ished the age old distinction between general and special 
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appearances. The court stated that under the Rule, a 
defendant need no longer appear specially to attack the 
Court's jurisdiction over him and is no longer required 
"at the door of the Federal Courthouse to intone that an-
cient abra cadabra of the law de bene esse, in order by its 
magic power to enable himself to remain outside even while 
he steps within." However, the court pointed out that 
under the rules if the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the 
person was not raised by Motion before Answer or in the 
Answer itself, it would be treated as waived, not because 
of the defendant's voluntary appearance but because of his 
failure to assert the defense within the time prescribed 
by the rules. 
A number of State Courts have adopted Rules of Pro-
cedure based on the Federal Rules. The Supreme Courts 
in those jurisdictions have recognized that the distinction 
between general and special appearances has been 
abolished. 
In D. W. Onan & Sons v. Superior Court, 179 P.2d 
243 (Arizona 1947) the Supreme Court of Arizona held that 
under Rule 12 (b), Sec. 21-429 ACA 1939, that special 
appearances to challenge jurisdiction over the persons were 
not necessary. The court stated that if the defendant so 
desires, he may present every defense or objection that he 
has in an answer without waiving any rights. The court 
further stated : 
"An objection that the court has not secured 
jurisdiction over the defendant may be pleaded in 
the answer. Often times a defendant might pref er 
to raise certain objections which he believes will 
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be sustained before resorting to the trouble of 
pleading an answer. This he may do. Under this 
Rule 12 (b) he may raise any or all of the follow-
ing objections which he may have by motion: (1) 
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) im-
proper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; (5) 
insufficiency of service of process; (6) failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 
In Treadwell v. The District Court in and for the City 
and County of Denver, 297 P. 2d 891 (Colo. 1956) the 
Supreme Court of Colorado held that Rule 12 (b) abolishes 
the distinction between general and special appearances. 
The court stated that if a motion to quash for lack of 
jurisdiction of a person is made before the Answer, then 
the jurisdiction of the Court over the person is properly 
raised and stands in question until the Motion is disposed 
of. 
"The rule (Rule 12 (b)) is almost identical with 
the federal rule of procedure and the federal cases 
seem to hold that a party may appear generally and 
still raise objections to jurisdiction of person. Such 
a motion, of course, must be filed in apt time, and 
the question cannot be raised after answers and 
other motions as to the merits have been filed. It 
cannot be contended that the written general appear-
ance of counsel in the case is a defense; it cannot 
be considered as a pleading; and it neither adds to 
nor detracts from the motion to quash, which was 
the only plea before the court." (Italics ours) 
See also Weant's Admr. v. Ellis, 287 S.W. 2d 446 (Ky. 
1955); Galler v. Slurzberg, 92 A.2d 89 (N.J. 1952) holding 
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that Rule 12 (b) has eliminated the distinction between 
general and special appearances. 
These cases clearly show that the distinction between 
general and special appearances has been abolished in those 
jurisdictions which have adopted rules similar to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In the instant case Cox's attorney appeared to re-
sist the proposed Amendment to plaintiff's complaint on 
the ground Cox had no property in the State of Utah which 
could be made the subject of an in rem proceeding. The 
substance of the appearance was to resist jurisdiction over 
the person of Cox. If Cox could file a motion to dismiss 
because of lack of jurisdiction over the person or could 
plead such a defense in his answer, then clearly, an appear-
ance to raise the question of jurisdiction over the person 
before an answer or motion were required would not waive 
that defense. There would only be a waiver of jurisdic-
tion over the person if Cox's attorney answered the amended 
complaint without raising the defense of lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person. Rule 12 (h) provides that a party 
waives all defenses and objections which he does not pre-
sent either by motion or in his answer, except the defense 
of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
failure to join an indispensable party and whenever it ap-
pears the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
As the court stated in Orange Theatre Corp. supra. 
"If the defense of lack of jurisdiction of the 
person is not raised by motion before answer or in 
the answer itself it is by the express terms of para-
graph (h) of Civil Procedure Rule 12 to be treated 
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as waived, not because of the defendant's voluntary 
appearance but because of his failure to assert the 
defense within the time prescribed by the rules." 
(Italics ours) 
The appearance of Cox's attorney to resist the motion 
to amend the complaint did not give the court jurisdiction 
over the person of Cox. The Trial Judge who heard the 
arguments of counsel, held Cox made a special appearance 
and did not waive his defense of lack of jurisdiction over 
the person. (R 61) His ruling should be sustained. 
POINT II. 
COX HAS NO PROPERTY IN THE STATE OF 
UTAH WHICH CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF AN 
IN REM ACTION SO THE SUMMONS SERVED 
ON HIM IN BETHESDA, MARYLAND, WAS 
PROPERLY QUASHED. 
Cox was served with a summons and amended com-
plaint in Bethesda, Maryland. (R 27) A writ of garnish-
ment was served on Travelers. It answered by denying 
that it was indebted to Cox in property or money and 
denying that it knew of or had any property, effects, goods, 
chattels, rights, credits or choses in action owing to Cox. 
Travelers admitted issuing a liability policy to Anaconda 
which insured persons using motor vehicles with the permis-
sion of the named insured. (R 43-47) Plaintiffs never re-
plied to the answer of the garnishee. Subsequently, Cox 
filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint against him 
on the ground the court did not have jurisdiction over his 
person and to quash the summons. (R 33) The motion was 
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supported by an affidavit in which Cox stated he was a 
resident of the State of Utah at the time of the accident 
and shortly thereafter moved to South America. The motion 
to dismiss and to quash summons was heard by Judge Aldon 
Anderson. The Judge granted the motion to quash summons 
after the issues had been fully briefed and argued. (R 82, 
127) 
Defendants contend that the liability insurance policy 
issued by Travelers to Anaconda does not constitute a "chose 
in action" under Rule 64 (D) Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure which can be the subject of an in rem proceeding. 
Rule 64 (D) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
contains the following provision relating to garnishment: 
"When plaintiff entitled to writ; affidavit. The 
plaintiff, at any time after the filing of the com-
plaint, may have a writ of garnishment issue, and 
attach the credits, effects, debts, choses in action, 
money, and other personal property of the defendant 
in the possession or in the control of any third per-
son, as garnishee, whether the same are due at the 
time of the service of the writ or are to become 
due thereafter, under the same circumstances and 
by filing with the court in which the action is pend-
ing an affidavit as required by subdivision (a) of 
Rule 64C, relating to Attachments; provided, that 
in addition to the requirements of the Affidavit for 
a writ of attachment the affidavit for a writ of 
garnishment shall state that plaintiff has good rea-
son to believe and does believe that a particular 
person, firm or corporation, private or public, has 
property, money, goods, chattels, credits or effects 
in his or its hands or under his or its control be-
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longing to the defendant, or that such person, firm 
or corporation is indebted to the defendant." 
Subparagraph (g) and (i) of Rule 64D contain the follow-
ing provisions : 
(g) * * * The garnishee may also deliver to the 
officer serving the writ the property belonging to 
the defendant, together with the money due to such 
defendant, as shown by the answer of the garnishee, 
and the officer shall make return of such property 
and money with the writ to the court, to be dealt 
with as thereafter ordered by the court. Thereupon 
the garnishee shall be relieved from further liability 
in the proceedings, unless his answer shall be suc-
cessfully controverted as hereinafter provided. 
(Italics ours) 
* * * 
(i) Judgment on Answer of Garnishee. If the 
plaintiff fails to reply to the answer of the gar-
nishee, he shall be deemed to have accepted it as 
correct, and judgment may be entered thereon. * * *" 
(Italics ours) 
The plaintiffs did not reply to the garnishee's answer. 
They are therefore deemed to have accepted as correct 
Traveler's answer that it had no property, effects, goods, 
chattels, rights, credits or choses in action of Cox. Plain-
tiffs failure to reply precludes them from questioning the 
correctness of the answer. 
Regardless of plaintiffs' failure to reply to the Answer, 
the liability insurance policy is not a chose in action. 
A "chose in action" is defined as "A right to personal 
16 
things of which the owner has not the possession, but 
merely a right of action for their possession." Blacks Law 
Dictionary 3rd Edition, p. 323. 
The term has also been held to include the right to 
recover sums of money from another: 
"The term "choses in action" is one of compre-
hensive import. It includes the infinite variety of 
contracts, covenants and promises which confer on 
one party a right to recover a personal chattel or a 
sum of money from another by action." Sheldon v. 
Sell 49 U.S. 441, 12 L.Ed. 1147 cited in Vol. 7 Words 
& Phrases, p. 167. 
The language of the insurance policy issued by Trav-
elers to Anaconda clearly shows that it does not constitute 
a "chose in action". The policy contains the following perti-
nent provisions: 
"INSURING AGREEMENTS 
1. Coverage A-Bodily Injury Liability 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury, sickness or 
disease, including death at any time resulting there-
from, sustained by any person and caused by acci-
dent. * * * (Italics ours) 
CONDITIONS 
13. Action Against Company. No action shall lie 
against the company unless, as a condition precedent 
thereto, the insured shall have fully complied with 
all the terms of this policy, nor until the amount 
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of the insured's obligation to pay shall have been 
finally determined either by judgment against the 
insured after actual trial or by written agreement 
of the insured, the claimant and the company." 
Under the terms of the insurance policy Travelers has 
the obligation to pay on behalf of the insured (Cox) all 
sums which he shall become legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of bodily injury. The insurance company 
has no obligation to pay on behalf of the insured until he 
becomes legally obligated to pay. Since Cox is not legally 
obligated to pay the plaintiffs any sum of money, Travelers 
has no monetary obligation owing on his behalf. The con-
tract of insurance is conditioned on the insured becoming 
legally obligated to pay. If there is no obligation on the 
insured to pay, there is no obligation on the insurance 
company. Unless a judgment is entered against Cox, 
Travelers will have no obligation to pay any money on his 
behalf. 
The language of the paragraph relating to actions 
against the Company specifically provides that no action 
shall lie against the Company until its obligation to pay 
shall have been finally determined either by judgment 
against the insured after actual trial or by written agree-
ment of the insured, the claimant and the company. It is 
clear from this language that there is no monetary obliga-
tion owing on behalf of Cox until a judgment has been 
entered against him, after actual trial, or a written agree-
ment has been entered into between Cox, the plaintiffs 
and the Travelers Insurance Company. 
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Cox has no contractual rights against the Travelers 
to pay money on his behalf until a judgment is entered 
against him. The contract of liability insurance does not 
constitute a chose in action because Cox has no right to 
recover any money from Travelers. 
The case of Gray v. Houck, 68 S.W. 2d 117 (Tenn. 
1934) is on all fours with the facts in the instant case. In 
that case the plaintiff Gray brought a suit against the de-
fendant Houck wherein jurisdiction was asserted by a 
petition for attachment by garnishment of the Travelers 
Insurance Company as the debtor of the defendant. The 
defendant Houck left the State of Tennessee before service 
could be had upon him and jurisdiction was asserted by 
garnishment of the Travelers Insurance Company as the 
debtor of the defendant. The lower court found that the 
insurance company was not indebted to the defendant and 
for that reason denied the attachment by garnishment of 
the insurance company and dismissed the suit. The lan-
guage of the insurance policy in the Houck case was similar 
to the language of the insurance policy issued to the Ana-
conda Company. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed 
the decision of the lower court holding that under the auto-
mobile liability policy, the insurance company was not 
subject to garnishment as the insured's debtor. The Court 
said that since the obligation of the insurance company to 
the insured was contingent and since there was no judge-
ment rendered and no agreement made, no garnishment 
could issue. The Court said: 
"(1) The contract thus pleaded is clearly one 
of indemnity against liability, but by the clause 
last quoted the obligation of the insurer to pay 
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and satisfy claims made against the insured arises 
only when such claims are matured by judgment or 
by written agreement of the parties interested, in-
cluding the insurer. The language of the contract 
is that 'no recovery against the company shall be 
had until the amount of the insured's liability 
shall have been determined by judgment or written 
agreement.' A right of recovery is obviously essen-
tial to a right of action, so that, by the terms of 
the contract, the insured has no right of action 
for the indemnity stipulated, in the absence of judg-
ment against him or an agreement fixing the amount 
of plaintiff's damages. The existence of such right 
of action is therefore contingent upon the rendition 
of judgment against the insured, the defendant to 
plaintiff's action for damages. That such event is 
uncertain and contingent is at least indicated by the 
plaintiff's inability to obtain service of process on 
the defendant, by reason of the defendant's non-
residence." 
The Court pointed out that it is a rule of universal 
application that the plaintiff in garnishment is, in his rela-
tion to the garnishee substituted merely to the rights of 
his own debtor and can enforce no demand against the 
garnishee which the debtor himself, if suing, would not 
be entitled to recover. The Court also stated that there 
is an underlying principle controlling the right to attach-
ment by garnishment, that the process can reach only debts 
absolutely existing and those not subject to the happening 
of a future event, rendering it uncertain whether the 
garnishee will or will not be indebted to the defendant. 
The Court then made the following observation: 
"The defendant herein has not suffered damage 
for which he is entitled to call upon his insurer for 
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indemnity. Such damage wil arise only from a 
judgment against him, or from a written agreement 
fixing the amount of the liability, according to the 
terms of the insurance contract. Until such con-
tingency occurs, there can be no breach of the 
contract to indemnify, and no right of action which 
the defendant or his creditors can prosecute against 
the insurer." 
The Court concluded that under the liability indemnity 
contract which it was construing, the obligation to pay 
dated from the rendition of a judgment against the de-
fendant and until such judgment was rendered the obliga-
tion was contingent and uncertain. The court held that 
until the defendant's liability to the plaintiff was deter-
mined by judgment rendered in a personal action against 
him, the insurer was not subject to garnishment as the 
defendant's debtor. 
Inasmuch as Travelers has no obligation to Cox until 
his liability to the plaintiffs is determined by a judgment 
rendered in a personal action against him, there is no chose 
in action existing between Travelers and Cox. 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Gray v. Houck, supra, 
on the ground that the statutes of Tennessee prohibited 
garnishment upon "debts or demands not due when the 
debtor resides out of the state." No reference is made to 
those statutes in the opinion. 
The Supreme Court of Tennessee did state that at-
tachment by garnishment was authorized by statute: 
"This is an action for damages for personal in-
juries suffered in an automobile accident. The 
defendant, Houck, left the state before service could 
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be had upon him, and jurisdiction is asserted in this 
action, begun several years later, by petition for 
attachment by garnishment of the Travelers Insur-
ance Company, as the debtor of the defendant. 
Such process is authorized by statute in behalf 
of a tort claimed against one who is 'indebted' to 
the defendant. Code, Sec. 9397, 9428, p. 117 
The Court further stated that garnishment could only 
reach debts absolutely existing. 
"* * * It is also an underlying principle, con-
trolling the right to attachment by garnishment, that 
the process can reach only debts absolutely existing, 
and those not subject to the happening of a future 
event, rendering it uncertain whether the garnishee 
will or will not be indebted to the defendant. * * *" 
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The Tennessee court did not discuss the question of 
whether the debt was due or not but rather was concerned 
with whether the debt would ever exist. The Court found 
that the obligation of the insurance company was contingent 
and uncertain and until judgment was entered, the insurer 
was not subject to garnishment. 
This court has previously held that contingent un-
liquidated contract claims are not subject to garnishment. 
In Acheson-Harder Co. v. Western Wholesale Notions 
Co., 72 Utah 323, 269 Pac. 1032 (1928) this court held 
accounts receivable placed with the garnishee for collection, 
but not collected, were not subject to garnishment. This 
court held that the service of the Writ of Garnishment ren-
ders the garnishee liable for only such property, money, 
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goods, chattels, credits or effects of defendant as were in the 
possession of the garnishee and such indebtedness of the 
garnishee in favor of the defendant as exists when the 
writ is served. This court stated: 
"It is one of the cardinal principles of the law 
of garnishment that the garnishee is under no 
greater liability to the plaintiff in whose behalf 
the writ of garnishment is issued than such 
garnishee was under to the defendant immediately 
before the writ was served. The liability of the 
garnishee to account to the defendant for property 
or indebtedness must be absolute in order that such 
property or indebtedness is garnishable." (Italics 
ours) 
While the applicable 1928 Utah statute did not con-
tain the phrase "chose in action" as an item that could 
be subject to garnishment, plaintiffs construed the statute 
to include "chose in action" as the Writ commanded the 
garnishee to retain in its possession all personal property, 
effects, choses in action of the defendant debtor. 
This court has held that an unliquidated tort claim is 
not subject to garnishment. 
In Paul v. Kirkendall, 6 Utah 2d 256, 311 P.2d 376 
(1957) this court held that an unliquidated tort claim 
against an automobile insurer was not a chose in action 
held by the insurer for the insured. This court further 
held that the insurer's liability, if any, was not subject to 
garnishment and could not be adjudicated in a garnishment 
proceeding brought by the holder of a judgment against 
the insured. In that case the plaintiff, Paul, recovered a 
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judgment against the defendant Kirkendall, in the sum of 
$20,000.00 for personal injuries arising out of an automo-
bile accident. The Maryland Casualty Company had issued 
a policy of insurance in favor of the defendant and paid 
the judgment to the limit of its policy coverage of 
$10,000.00 Plaintiff then sued out a writ of garnishment 
which was served on the Maryland Casualty Company as 
garnishee. In the interrogatories it was asked if the 
garnishee was indebted to the defendant. The answer 
to this question was negative. Plaintiff replied to the 
answers alleging that the garnishee insurance company 
was indebted to the defendant in the amount by which 
the judgment taken against the defendant exceeded the 
amount of the policy coverage. The plaintiff claimed that 
the garnishee insurance company negligently and carelessly, 
and in violation of its duty, failed and refused to settle 
the case notwithstanding the garnishee knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the 
defendant was liable to the plaintiffs for damages far in 
excess of the limits of the policy. The lower court denied 
the insurer's motion for summary judgment and it ap-
pealed. This Court reversed, holding that the insurer was 
entitled to a summary judgment in its favor. The ques-
tion presented on the appeal was whether or not the 
liability of the garnishee insurance company alleged in the 
plaintiff's reply to the garnishee's answer could be reached 
by garnishment. This court in analyzing Rule 64(D) 
(Garnishment) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure made 
the following statement: 
"It must be conceded that the purpose of our 
garnishment staute is to enable a creditor to reach 
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and attach property described in Rule 64D belonging 
to the judgment debtor, in the possession or under 
the control of a third person. It must be apparent 
that Maryland Casualty Company was not at any 
time the holder or possessor of a chose of action 
against itself belonging to the defendant. The 
garnishment rule does not contemplate litigation of 
a chose in action between the creditor and the gar-
nishee. All garnishee is required to do is to hold 
any property, goods, chattels, choses in action of 
the defendant which the garnishee has in his pos-
session. Garnishee is not required to litigate his 
liability for a judgment under a chose in action held 
by him. If the garnishee surrenders the property 
of defendant being held by him and pays the money 
due to defendant from him, he has no further obliga-
tion except to truthfully report." * * * 
The Kirkendall case supra held that an unliquidated 
tort claim is not subject to garnishment. Cox has no claim 
in tort or contract against Travelers. 
The issue is not whether the chose in action will become 
due after the service of the writ, but whether or not any 
chose in action exists. The language of Rule 64D "whether 
the same are due or are to become due thereafter" means 
that the debt or chose in action exists and is due at the 
time the writ is served or will become due thereafter. The 
rule does not contemplate that a debt or chose in action 
which may come into existence after the writ is served is 
subject to garnishment. If Travelers should breach its 
insurance contract, Cox would have an unliquidated claim 
for breach of contract. The unliquidated contract claim 
(which Cox may or may not have at some future date) 
is no more subject to garnishment than the unliquidated 
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tort claim in the Kirkendall case. In both cases the claim 
is contingent and subject to the happening of future events 
which may or may not ripen the claim into a valid judg-
ment. 
Defendants contend that the Utah Safety Responsibility 
Act, has no application to the case at bar. 
Section 41-12-21 (f) (1) and (2) of the Act provides: 
"* * * (1) the liability of the insurance carrier 
with respect to the insurance required by this act 
shall become absolute whenever injury or damage 
covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs; 
said policy may not be canceled or annuled as to such 
liability by any agreement between the insurance 
carrier and insured after the occurrence of the in-
jury or damage; no statement made by the insured 
or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall 
def eat or void said policy; 
(a) the satisfaction by the insured of a judgment 
for such injury or damage shall not be a condition 
precedent to the right or duty of the insurance car-
rier to make payment on account of such injury or 
damages * * *" 
This section applies to policies that are required as 
proof of financial responsibility. In Utah Farm Bureau 
Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 
(1957), this Court held that Sec. 21 of the Motor Vehicle 
Safety Responsibility Act applies to those insurance policies 
required by the Department to be furnished as proof of 
financial responsibility after the owner or operator has 
been involved in an accident or has violated the motor 
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vehicle laws. This court further held that where the policy 
of insurance in question had not been issued because it was 
required by the Commission to furnish proof of financial 
responsibility in conformance with the Act, the provisions 
of the Act did not apply to it. 
"It being conceded that the policy was not is-
sued because Chugg had been required by the 
Commission to furnish proof of financial responsi-
bility in conformance with the Act, it fol'ows that 
the provisions of the Act do not apply to it. Unless 
Chugg had been within the purview of the Act when 
the policy was issued, its provisions, unless illegal, 
are subject to the same construction as any other 
contract, in accordance with the expressed intent 
of the parties." (Italics ours) 
The defendants attached to their original memorandum 
the affidavit of Ralph Westwood, the Director of the Finan-
cial Responsibility Division of the State of Utah, in which 
he stated that at no time had Dennis P. Cox been required 
to file with such division proof of "financial responsibility" 
as defined in Sec. 41-12-1 (k) of the Utah Code Anno-
tated (R 95). 
Since the policy of insurance issued by Travelers to 
Anaconda was not required by the Commission to furnish 
proof of financial responsibility, the terms of the Act do 
not apply to the policy in question. The policy of insur-
ance issued by Travelers is subject to the same construction 
as any other contract, in accordance with the expressed 
intent of the parties. 
It is obvious that the language of Sec. 41-12-21 does not 
apply to the policy of insurance issued by Travelers to Ana-
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conda and therefore its liability is not "absolute" as claimed 
by the plaintiffs. The language of Sec. 41-12-21 U.C.A. 
does not fix liability on the insurance carrier without a 
judgment entered against the insured. The Insurance 
Company is only liable if the insured is negligent and such 
negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. 
The language "the liability of the insurance carrier with 
respect to the insurance required by this Act shall become 
absolute'', means that the Insurance Company cannot can-
cel the policy or attempt to escape its obligation under the 
policy. Its contractural obligation to the insured is "abso-
lute" but it obviously is not liable to third persons unless 
the insured is also liable. 
Plaintiffs cite United States v. J. T. Hubbell, 323 
F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1963) as authority for the proposi-
tion that plaintiffs may garnish the alleged contractual 
right which Cox has against Travelers. That case involved 
the question of priority of a federal tax lien and the claim 
of certain contractors to determine which was entitled 
to the proceeds of a state court judgment. The judgment 
in the state court had been obtained by Lewis, a painting 
subcontractor, against the Housing Authority of the City 
of Dallas, which paid the amount of the judgment into 
court and interpleaded the United States and the general 
contractors. Lewis had been required by the Housing Au-
thority to apply a second coat of paint on a housing project 
at no extra cost to either the prime contractor or the Hous-
ing Authority. As a result of this extra work Lewis 
became insolvent and one of his unpaid debts consisted 
of withholding taxes due the government. After the filing 
of the tax lien Lewis entered into an agreement with the 
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general contractors to give them 35% of the amount re-
covered from the Housing Authority in consideration of the 
general contractor's prosecuting the claim. The district 
court held the general contractors were entitled to the 
judgment pursuant to the assignment from Lewis. The 
Circuit Court reversed holding the tax lien was perfected 
prior to the assignment. In so holding, the court did rule 
that the tax lien attached to the unliquidated tort claim of 
Lewis. It is respectfully submitted that the question of 
when a tax lien attaches has no bearing on the issues in 
the instant case. There the court held the tax lien at-
tached to an unliquidated tort claim. Here the plaintiffs 
are attempting to garnish an alleged contract claim. 
This court has previously held that an unliquidated tort 
claim is not subject to garnishment. See Paul v. Kirken-
dall, supra. A suit involving the priority of a tax lien has 
no application to an attempted garnishment of an alleged 
contractual right to obtain personal jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs also cite the case of Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 
F. 2d 541 (8th Cir. 1927) cert. den. 276 U.S. 628, 72 L.Ed. 
739, 48 S.Ct. 321 (1928) as conclusive authority in favor 
of the plaintiffs. This suit involved a claim under a 
property insurance (robbery) policy and has no application 
to the case at bar. The court held that an unadjusted 
claim for loss under an "insurance policy'' is subject to 
garnishment. The cases cited by the court as authority 
for this proposition deal with claims under fire insurance 
policies. The courts generally hold that claims under fire 
insurance policies are subject to attachment or garnishment 
when the proof of loss has been made and the claim has 
been adjusted. 
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"As a general rule, the right of an insured 
against an insurance company under a policy of 
insurance on property is subject to attachment or 
garnishment at the suit of creditors of the insured, 
at least where proof of loss has been made and the 
claim has been adjusted." 6 Am. Jur. 2d page 679. 
See 38 ALR 1072, 53 ALR 724 (Garnishment of Fire 
Insurer) 
An obligation exists under a fire insurance policy when 
the fire occurs. No obligation exists under a liability in-
surance policy until the liability of the insured has been 
established by judgment or agreement. 
"Sec. 210. Generally; right of action in absence of 
provision therefor. * * * If the contract is treated 
as a contract of liability insurance, as distinguished 
from a policy of indemnity insurance against actual 
loss, the insurer is subject to garnishment by a per-
son who has recovered judgment against the insured 
for an injury covered by the policy where the com-
pany has waived any defense which it might other-
wise have urged as against the insured. * * *" 
(Italics ours) 
7 Am. Jur. 2d, page 554. 
The question of jurisdiction was not presented in either 
of the cases cited by plaintiff as authority for their position. 
Plaintiffs cannot convert an in personam action into 
an in rem action. The Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that if a suit involves the determination of personal 
liability of a defendant, he must he brought within its 
jurisdiction by service of process within the state or by 
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his voluntary appearance before the proceedings will have 
any validity. 
The footnote in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 
565 contains the following: 
"The term 'due process of law', when applied 
to judicial proceedings, means a course of legal 
proceedings according to those rules and principles 
which have been established by our system of 
jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of 
private rights. To give such proceedings any valid-
ity, there must be a tribunal competent by its con-
stitution to pass upon the subject matter of the 
suit; and if that involves merely a determination 
of the personal liability of the defendant, he must 
be brought within its jurisdiction by service of 
process within the State, or his voluntary appear-
ance." (Italics ours) 
In this case the cause of action against Cox follows him 
wherever he goes. The plaintiffs can sue Cox in Mary-
land and if they are successful in obtaining a judgment, 
then they may garnish the Insurance Company. But to 
permit a personal judgment to be entered against Cox 
under the label of an "in rem theory" would be completely 
contrary to the constitutional rights of Cox. 
Cox has no chose in action against Travelers. No 
chose in action will come into existence until plaintiffs 
obtain a judgment against Cox. Personal jurisdiction is a 
fundamental prerequisite for an in personam action. If 
Cox has any rights against Travelers they are contingent 
and unliquidated. This court has held that neither unliqui-
dated tort claims nor unliquidated contract claims are 
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subject to garnishment. See Paul v. Kirkendall, Acheson 
Hardin v. Western Wholesale, supra. 
It is respectfully submitted that Cox has no property 
in the State of Utah which can be the subject of an in rem 
action. The order quashing summons should be affirmed. 
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POINT III 
COX WAS NOT IN THE SCOPE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT, 
SO SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
ANACONDA WAS PROPERLY GRANTED. 
At the pretrial of this action Anaconda moved for 
summary judgment. (R 133) 
The motion was supported by the affidavit of Cox in 
which he stated: 
"At the time of the accident I was on my way 
home to have lunch with my wife. I was living at 
615 Grand Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. On a 
number of occasions I used the car to pick up labora-
tory equipment on my way back to my office in the 
Kearns Building. I picked up the laboratory equip-
ment at Braun, Knecht & Heimann at 650 West 8th 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. I cannot now recall 
whether I was going to pick up equipment after 
lunch on the day of the accident. 
I intended to return to the Anaconda office in 
the Kearns Building after lunch, but whether I 
was going to pick up laboratory equipment, I do not 
recall at this time. 
I had not intention of going into the field after 
lunch." (R 134-135) 
There is nothing in the record to controvert the undi-
puted fact that Cox was driving home to have lunch with 
his wife when the accident happened. (Plaintiff's Brief, 
page 36). Cox stated that on occasions he used the car to 
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pick up lab equipment at Braun, Knecht & Heimann, 850 
West 8th South, Salt Lake City, Utah. He could not recall 
whether he was going to pick up equipment on the day of 
the accident. Cox lived on the East side of town (Grand 
Street begins at 965 East 7th South) and the place where 
he was to pick up equipment was on the West side of town. 
It is also undisputed that Cox intended to return to the 
Anaconda office in the Kearns Building after lunch. He 
had no intention of going into the field. (R 135) 
Roland B. Mulchay, the Assistant Chief Geologist in 
charge of geological work in the west for Anaconda, testi-
fied in his deposition that the company cars were not 
supposed to be used on personal business. (Mulchay de-
position p. 10, 11) Mulchay had no knowledge of why Cox 
had the car at the time of the accident. (Mulchay deposi-
tion, p. 13) Mulchay further testified that Anaconda 
employees were permitted to take company vehicles to 
their homes in anticipation of field trips the following day. 
(Mulchay deposition p. 13) Mulchay stated that a Malcolm 
Kildale, now deceased, was the immediate supervisor of 
Cox. Mulchay had no knowledge of what Kildale might 
have authorized on the day of the accident. (Mulchay 
deposition p. 12) 
Anaconda admitted in its answer to plaintiffs amended 
complaint that Cox was using the vehicle with express 
permission. At the pretrial Anaconda moved to amend its 
answer to deny that at the time of the accident Cox was 
using the vehicle with express permission. The motion 
to amend was denied by Judge Hanson. (R 133) 
Whether Cox was using the vehicle with express per-
mission or implied permission is immaterial. The con-
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trolling question is whether or not Anaconda received a 
business benefit from Cox's use of the car. 
This court has repeatedly held that an employer is 
not liable for damage caused by his employee, unless the 
employee is furthering his employer's business at the time 
such damage occurs. If the employee is engaged in a pur-
pose of his own, or in purposes other than the master's 
business, he has departed from the scope of his employ-
ment and the master is not liable for his negligence. If 
the vehicle is being used in the servant's personal or social 
affairs, the master is not liable. 
In Wright v. Intermountain Motor Car Company, 53 
Utah 176, 177 Pac. 237 (1919) the servant who was em-
ployed to demonstrate automobiles, to accommodate an 
out-of-town customer, took the automobile out after busi-
ness hours for his own social affairs. This court held, as 
a matter of law, that a master is not liable for injury 
caused by its servant where the automobile is being used 
by the servant for his own purposes. 
In Fowkes v. G.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 46 
Utah 502, 151 Pac. 53 (1915) this Court held that the 
master was not liable for the acts of the servant where, at 
the time of the accident, the servant was not discharging 
any duty or transacting any business for the master. This 
court stated that the test to determine whether a master 
is liable for his servant is as follows : 
"The test to determine whether a master is 
liable to a stranger for the consequences of his 
servant's misconduct is to inquire whether the latter 
was doing what he was employed to do at the time 
he caused the injury complained of." 
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In Cannon v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company of 
California, 60 Utah 346, 208 Pac. 519 (1922) the servant 
was employed to drive a delivery truck. After the servant 
finished his deliveries on the day of the accident, he drove 
his truck to his home and used it to move furniture for 
himself. While the servant was on his way back to the 
garage, he ran into and injured the plaintiff. This court 
held that the driver was not acting within the scope of 
his employment and that the employer was not liable. 
In Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 65, 102 P. 2d 493 (1940) 
the servant was employed to drive a delivery truck for the 
master. The servant was not authorized to take passengers 
in the grocery delivery truck without permission. On the 
day of the accident, the servant had made four deliveries 
when he agreed to give two girls a ride in the truck down 
to the business section of Salt Lake City. After picking 
up the girls, he made his last delivery. Thereafter the 
servant became involved in a collision in which the plain-
tiff's son was fatally injured. This Court held that the 
servant's action was not a mere deviation, but was a de-
parture from the course of his employment and the master's 
responsibility for the servant's act had ceased as a matter 
of law. 
These Utah cases clearly set forth the law in Utah 
that where a servant is using his master's vehicle in 
furtherance of his own personal affairs, he is not in the 
scope of his employment and his master is not responsible 
for injuries caused by the servant. 
When an employee uses his employer's motor vehicle 
to go from his place of employment to a place to eat, he 
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is not in the scope of his employment in the absence of 
some special benefit to his employer. 
"An employee, in using his employer's motor 
vehicle to go from his work to a place where he in-
tends to eat, is not ordinarily within the scope of 
his employment, in the absence of some special bene-
fit to the employer, and therefore the employer is 
not liable for the negligent operation of his motor 
vehicle during such a trip. The mere fact that the 
employee's negligence while so doing where there is 
employer's motor vehicle in going to his meals does 
not change this rule and render the employer liable 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the 
employee's negligence while so doing where there is 
nothing to indicate benefit to the employer, although 
in some jurisdictions under such circumstances the 
employer could be held to the statutory liability of 
an owner for the negligence of one whom he permits 
to operate his vehicle." 
8 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, Section 629 
An annotation in 52 ALR 2d 350 entitled "Employer's 
liability for employee's negligence in operating the em-
ployer's car in going to and from work and meals" contains 
the following statement of the rule concerning employees 
going to meals. 
Going to meals 
"Rule that employee is generally not within 
scope of employment. 
"It has frequently been recognized that an em-
ployee using his master's car to go from his work to 
a place where he intends to eat before returning to 
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work is not ordinarily within the scope of his em-
ployment, in the absence of evidence of some special 
business benefit to the employer from this use of 
the car." 
In Miller v. Hoefgen, 183 P.2d 850 (New Mexico 1947) 
an employer volunteered the use of his truck to an employee 
to go to lunch because the employee had worked one-half 
hour past his time. The accident occurred while the em-
ployee was driving the truck to lunch. The Supreme Court 
of New Mexico held that the employee was using the truck 
on a personal errand and was not acting within the scope 
of his employment. 
The court stated : 
"As we appraise the evidence in the case, the 
defendant, Hoefgen, as an accommodation to the 
defendant, Rinner, permitted him to use the truck 
on a personal errand. Its use by the defendant, 
Rinner, did not shorten the lunch perbd, nor enable 
him to return to work earlier. There was no previous 
understanding that Rinner would be permitted to 
use the truck for working overtime. * * We, there-
fore, conclude that at the time of the accident Rinner 
was engaged in a personal mission and that his 
business relations with the defendant, Hoefgen, 
were terminated, or at least suspended, prior to the 
time the injuries were sustained by plaintiffs." 
(Italics ours) 
The act of Cox in driving home to lunch did not bestow 
any business benefit on Anaconda. 
In the case of Larkins v. Utah Copper Co., 127 P.2d 
354 (Oregon 1942) cited by plaintiffs, the employee was 
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returning from a business trip when he was involved in an 
accident with the plaintiff. Although the employee had 
deviated from his employment in going on a mission of his 
own, the accident did not occur until after he had resumed 
the work of his master. 
Plaintiff's argument that Cox was in the scope of his 
employment because he was subject to call is without merit. 
Under this theory no employee would ever go out of the 
scope of his employment because theoretically he is always 
subject to call. Any employee could be called to handle a 
special project or replace an absent worker. A judge could 
be called to hear a special motion or sign an order. The 
fact that we are all subject to call does not place us in 
the scope of our employment. If the call comes, we would 
not resume our employment until we are engaged in some 
activity which bestowed a benefit on our employer. In the 
instant case Cox did not receive a call to go on a field trip. 
He had no intention of going into the field after lunch. 
(R 134, 135) It is respectfully submitted that the alleged 
possibility of a call is no evidence that Cox was in the scope 
of his employment at the time of the accident. 
Rule 56 ( c) of the amendments to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure effective October 1, 1965, contains the fol-
lowing provision relating to summary judgment: 
" ( e) Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony; 
Defense Required. Supporting and opposing affi-
davits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall 
set forth such facts as would be admissible in evi-
dence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant 
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts 
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thereof ref erred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit 
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depo-
sitions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment 
is made and supported as provided in this rule, an 
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allega-
tions or denials of his pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him." (Italics ours) 
Summary judgment is a useful tool in the administra-
tion of justice. In the instant case the facts are undisputed. 
Cox's uncontroverted affidavit conclusively shows that he 
was on his way home to lunch at the time of the accident. 
He was not engaged in any activity which bestowed a 
business benefit on his employer. The order granting sum-
mary judgment should be sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have abolished the 
age old distinction between special and general appearance. 
The defendant is now required to raise all defenses, juris-
dictional or otherwise, by motion or in the answer or they 
will be waived. Cox made a "special appearance" out of an 
abundance of caution to object to the proposed amendment 
to the complaint on the ground he had no property in the 
State of Utah which could be made the subject of an in rem 
proceeding. The objection was directed at the matter of 
jurisdiction over Cox. If the issue could be raised by motion, 
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or answer, it could obviously be raised by specific objection. 
The trial court properly held Cox had made a "special" 
appearance and had not waived his objection to jurisdiction. 
Cox has no "chose in action" against Travelers so there 
is no property in the State of Utah which can be the subject 
of an in rem proceeding. Plaintiffs have not acquired juris-
diction over Cox. Plaintiffs cannot acquire an in personam 
judgment against Cox under the guise of an in rem action. 
The absence of personal jurisdiction would render any 
judgment against Cox a nullity and deprive him of his 
property without due process of law in violation of his 
constitutional rights. No action will lie against Travelers 
until a judgment is obtained against Cox. The summons 
served on Cox in Bethesda, Maryland, was properly 
quashed. 
Cox was on his way home to lunch at the time of the 
accident. This activity did not confer a business benefit on 
Anaconda. The alleged possibility that Cox might have been 
called to go somewhere is not sufficient to place Cox in the 
scope of his employment. He never did receive a call and 
intended to return to the office after lunch. The order 
granting summary judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
Attorneys for defendants 
and Respondents 
